Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.

Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...) its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. (shrink)

"To be a philosopher and to be a feminist are one and the same thing. A feminist is a woman who does not allow anyone to think in her place."-from _Hipparchia's Choice_ A work of rare insight and irreverence, _Hipparchia's Choice_ boldly recasts the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the post-Derrideans as one of masculine texts and male problems. The position of women, therefore, is less the result of a hypothetical "femininity" and more the fault of exclusion by (...) men. Nevertheless, women have been and continue to be drawn to "the exercise of thought." So how does a female philosopher become a conceptually adventurous woman? Focusing on the work of Sartre and Beauvoir (specifically, his sexism and her relation to it), Michèle Le Doeuff shows how women philosophers can reclaim a place for feminist concerns. Is _The Second Sex_ a work of philosophy, and, if so, what can it teach us about the relation of philosophy to experience? Now with a new epilogue, _Hipparchia's Choice_ points the way toward a discipline that is accountable to history, feminism, and society. (shrink)

Are we the people we were? If we are continuants, then the answer to this question is an affirmative one. But it is a moot point whether anything is a continuant. The debate over this issue—of whether there are such things as continuants—is often conducted in the context of theories concerning the apparent passage of time. Thus it has been argued that the tenseless theory of time, according to which time does not really pass, forces us to tear down part (...) of the basis for the intuitive distinction between ordinary, reidentifiable objects on the one hand, and processes on the other, and to regard such objects as mountains as persisting through time in exactly the way that thunderstorms do: by having distinct temporal parts at different times. I confess that I am a tenseless theorist of time, and take that theory to entail such a conclusion about the persistence of objects. But it is not just a certain stance over time’s passage that motivates sympathy towards temporal parts and suspicion of continuants. Thinking of objects as having temporal parts sits more comfortably than does the rival view with two natural assumptions concerning continuity: that beginning and ceasing to exist, at least for most objects, involves underlying changes which are continuous in nature; and that objects exhibit continuity through time, in the sense of not having gaps in their existence. Or so I shall argue in what follows. (shrink)

The quantification of phase synchrony between neuronal signals is of crucial importance for the study of large-scale interactions in the brain. Two methods have been used to date in neuroscience, based on two distinct approaches which permit a direct estimation of the instantaneous phase of a signal [Phys. Rev. Lett. 81 (1998) 3291; Human Brain Mapping 8 (1999) 194]. The phase is either estimated by using the analytic concept of Hilbert transform or, alternatively, by convolution with a complex wavelet. In (...) both methods the stability of the instantaneous phase over a window of time requires quantification by means of various statistical dependence parameters (standard deviation, Shannon entropy or mutual information). The purpose of this paper is to conduct a direct comparison between these two methods on three signal sets: (1) neural models; (2) intracranial signals from epileptic patients; and (3) scalp EEG recordings. Levels of synchrony that can be considered as reliable are estimated by using the technique of surrogate data. Our results demonstrate that the differences between the methods are minor, and we conclude that they are fundamentally equivalent for the study of neuroelectrical signals. This offers a common language and framework that can be used for future research in the area of synchronization. © 2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. (shrink)

Over the last decade, businesses, policymakers, and researchers alike have advocated the need for value creation through inter-organizational collaboration. Researchers have widely argued that organizations that are engaged in collaborative processes create value. Because researchers have tended to focus on the identification of organizational motivations and on key success factors for collaboration, however, both the nature and processes of value creation in inter-organizational collaboration have yet to be examined. A recent theory by Austin and Seitanidi :726–758, 2012a; Nonprofit Volunt Sect (...) Q 41:929–968, 2012b) has proposed an analytical framework for analyzing value creation in inter-organizational collaboration, based on four types of value. The purpose of this current study is to empirically test this framework, and to provide key pointers for analyzing the nature of value, particularly in relation to learning. Our detailed empirical research is based on a 6-year retrospective case study of an inter-organizational partnership within an international development project for local economic development in Guatemala. The study’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides evidence of the critical path of the creation of diverse types of values in a collaborative process; second, it links the different types of value creation with the types of learning that occur in an inter-organizational process. (shrink)

Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means ‘Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?’, recent discussions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. But sup posing that kind of reduction—‘epistemological reduction’—to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. (...) Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap. Introduction: missing elements and the mystery of discreteness The refutation of physicalism A combinatorial theory of physical possibilia Combinatorialism and the Bohr model Objections The missing premises and a disanalogy with mind. (shrink)

Offering a new answer to an age-old problem: the meaning of a just or equitable distribution of resources, Julian Le Grand examines the principal interpretations of equity used by economists and political philosophers. He argues that none captures the essence of the term as well as an alternative conception relating equity to the existence or otherwise of individual choice. Le Grand shows that this conception is not only philosophically well-grounded but is also directly relevant to key areas of distributional policy. (...) His theoretical argument is complemented by detailed discussion of the application of the central idea to specific areas of policy, including the distribution of health and health care, central government grants to local governments and the measurement of income for tax purposes. Equity and Choice is written by an economist, but is intended for political philosophers and social policy analysts as well as economists. Hence the key chapters are written in a non-technical fashion, with specialized material relegated to appendices. This book is a unique combination of philosophical, economic and policy analysis and represents a major contribution in all three areas. (shrink)

In this brillant meditation on conceptions of history, Le Goff traces the evolution of the historian's craft. Examining real and imagined oppositions between past and present, ancient and modern, oral and written history, _History and Memory_ reveals the strands of continuity that have characterized historiography from ancient Mesopotamia to modern Europe.

What is agnosticism? Is it a belief, or just the absence of belief? What is the 'agnostic' principle? Robin Le Poidevin takes a philosophical approach to the issue of agnosticism, challenging some of the common assumptions, arguing in favour of the agnostic attitude, and considering its place in society and education.

E. J. Lowe sets out in a recent paper1 to refute McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, by exposing an ‘indexical fallacy’ in his disproof of the existence of tensed (i. e., A-series) facts.2 Lowe then develops an original account of what makes time the dimension of change, based on his own account of tensed facts. But in our opinion he fails on both counts: (1) he fails to refute McTaggart's perfectly sound disproof of tensed facts, which shows that (...) time can be real only if (Lowe and McTaggart not withstanding) it needs no tensed facts, and (2) he fails to explain the temporal character of change, since his account of it has an exact spatial analogue. In what follows we argue these two points in turn. (shrink)

La vieille question du statut ontologique du présent refait aujourd’hui surface au travers du débat qui oppose présentisme et éternisme. Les présentistes défendent la thèse selon laquelle seul ce qui est présent existe. Les éternistes soutiennent quant à eux que le présent ne jouit d’aucun privilège ontologique, les choses passées et futures existant tout autant que les choses présentes. Dans cet article nous ne chercherons pas à départager les protagonistes mais à écarter les théories dites « hybrides » qui prétendent (...) bénéficier des avantages de chacune des positions sans hériter de leurs inconvénients. Nous commencerons par retracer le débat entre présentisme et éternisme (section 1), puis nous présenterons les motivations des défenseurs des théories hybrides (section 2). Enfin, dans notre dernière section, nous avancerons un argument qui, s’il est juste, montre que les théories hybrides ne sont pas cohérentes. (shrink)

Vise à découvrir comment l'intuition découle de la théorie husserlienne de l'être et le rôle qu'elle y joue. Pour situer son étude par la différence, E. Levinas commence par exposer les deux courants dominants de la philosophie allemande au tournant du siècle: le psychologisme et le naturalisme. Puis il montre comment la philosophie naturaliste est dépassée par Husserl, aboutissant à une nouvelle conception de l'être, qui fait comprendre que l'intuition n'est pas seulement un mode de connaissance parmi les autres, mais (...) le phénomène primitif qui rend possible la vérité elle-même. Le dernier chapitre montre la dimension philosophique qui s'ouvre avec une nouvelle théorie d. (shrink)

La pertinence de la métaphysique analytique a fait l'objet de critiques : Ladyman et Ross, par exemple, ont suggéré d'abandonner ce domaine. French et McKenzie ont défendu la métaphysique analytique en affirmant qu'elle développe des outils qui pourraient s'avérer utiles pour la philosophie de la physique. Dans cet article, nous montrons dans un premier temps que cette défense heuristique de la métaphysique peut être étendue au domaine scientifique de l'ontologie appliquée, qui utilise des théories et outils issus de la métaphysique (...) analytique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous développons le parallèle que font French et McKenzie entre les mathématiques et la métaphysique pour montrer que l'ensemble du domaine de la métaphysique analytique, étant donné son utilité non seulement pour la philosophie mais également pour la science, devrait continuer à exister en tant que domaine largement autonome. (shrink)

Selon une analyse très répandue aujourd'hui, la société contemporaine serait caractérisée par une vaste autonomie des acteurs ; pourtant, ce n'est pas parce que l'hétéronomie autoritaire a régressé au cours des dernières décennies que toute forme d'hétéronomie a disparu, ni que l'autonomie s'étend automatiquement à toute la société. Les domaines dans lesquels le terme « autonomie » est actuellement d'usage courant sont multiples et les acceptions scientifiques du concept fort diverses ; est-ce à dire qu'un même mot est employé pour (...) désigner des faits irréductibles entre eux ou bien n'est-il de véritable autonomie que complexe, tant individuelle que collective ? En tout cas, l'autonomie est moins, aujourd'hui, une réalité, qu'un projet de société, à la fois exigeant, limité et novateur. (shrink)

Die Hauptthese des Buches besteht darin, "die Zeit nicht als eine Abwertung der Ewigkeit zu denken, sondern als Verhältnis zu demjenigen, was, als von sich aus Unangleichbares, absolut Anderes, sich nicht durch die Erfahrung angleichen läßt, oder als Verhältnis zu dem, was, als von sich aus Unendliches, sich nicht begreifen läßt". Der Andere steht zum Ich im Verhältnis der Nicht-Gleichzeitigkeit (Diachronie), der "Distanz, die Nähe ist". Paradigmen solcher uneinholbaren Anderheit sind der Tod und das Weibliche. Levinas zeigt jedoch in "Le (...) temps et l'autre", wie es im Verhältnis zur Anderheit ein Durchbrechen der in sich verschlossenen Einsamkeit, ein wirkliches Transzendieren gibt, das nicht mehr Rückkehr des Selben zu sich ist. Die deutsche Übersetzung erschien 1984 erstmals im Felix Meiner Verlag und wurde von Ludwig Wenzler für die Neuausgabe (nun in der Philosophischen Bibliothek) korrigiert. (shrink)

L'éternalisme, la thèse selon laquelle les entités que nous catégorisons comme étant passées, présentes et futures existent tout autant, est la meilleure approche ontologique de l'existence temporelle qui soit en accord avec les théories de la relativité restreinte et de la relativité générale. Cependant, les théories de la relativité restreinte et générale ne sont pas fondamentales si bien que plusieurs programmes de recherche tentent de trouver une théorie plus fondamentale de la gravité quantique rassemblant tous les enseignements de la physique (...) relativiste et de la physique quantique. Certaines de ces approches soutiennent que le temps n'est pas fondamental. Toutefois, si le temps n'est pas fondamental, quelles en sont les conséquences pour l'éternalisme et les débats sur l'existence dans le temps ? Premièrement, je soutiendrai que la non-fondamentalité du temps que l'on rencontre dans la théorie des cordes mène à l'éternalisme standard. Deuxièmement, je soutiendrai que la non-fondamentalité du temps rencontrée dans la gravité quantique à boucles implique l'éternalisme atemporel, à savoir une nouvelle position qui demeure fidèle à l'esprit de l'éternalisme standard. (shrink)

Consider the agnostic who thinks that reason and evidence are neutral on the question of God’s existence, and as a result neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist. Can such an agnostic live a genuinely religious life – even one in which God is the central animating idea? They might do so by accepting Pascal’s Wager: the expected rewards will always be greater if one bets on God’s existence than if one does not. Or they (...) might accept William James’s argument that religious beliefs are properly activated by our passional nature. But both of these routes involve abandoning the initial agnosticism, and so are open to charges of irrationality. In this paper I explore a third route to the religious life, suggested by Pascal’s discussion, one which uses fiction and make-believe as the central prop. It might seem that this too entails abandoning agnosticism in favour of the view that religion just is fiction. I suggest, however, that there is a phenomenon which I term “serious make-believe” in which one can remain agnostic about whether the object of make-believe is real or a useful fiction. Applied to religion, the result is a religious life that is both genuinely engaged and yet, by remaining agnostic, cannot be accused of irrationality. (shrink)

Une negation qui se voudrait absolue, mais niant tout existant -jusqu'a l'existant qu'est la pensee effectuant cette negation meme-ne saurait mettre fin a la scene toujours ouverte de l'etre, de l'etre au sens verbal: etre anonyme qu'aucun etant ne revendique, etre sans etants ou sans etres, incessant remue-menage, pour reprendre une metaphore de Blanchot, il y a impersonnel, comme un il pleut ou un il fait nuit. Terme foncierement distinct du es gibt heideggerien. Il n'a jamais ete ni la traduction, (...) ni la demarque de l'expression allemande et de ses connotations d'abondance et de generosite. Il faut insister sur le caractere desertique, obsedant et horrible de l'il y a et sur son inhumaine neutralite. Neutralite a surmonter. Sortie recherchee dans ce livre. Analyses esquissees dans ce sens de la relation a autrui. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

ObjectiveTo explore the effect of modified constraint-induced movement therapy on upper limbs residual dysfunction for infancy with the sequelas of unilateral brachial plexus injury.MethodsSingle blind randomized controlled trial of mCIMT vs. standard care. An enrolling 31 infants with a uBPI exhibiting residual dysfunction of the affected upper limb for over 6 months was conducted. And functional outcomes pertaining to the affected upper limb were assessed via AMS, GRES, RHS, and MSS at 0, 3, and 6 months after treatment.ResultsNo differences were (...) found in baseline AMS, MSS, GRES, or RHS between the control and mCIMT groups [F = 0.062, P = 0.086; F = 0.483, P = 0.499; F = 0.272, P = 0.610; Z = −0.336, P = 7.373]. At the 3- and 6-month follow-up time points, AMS, MSS, and GRES scores were significantly improved over baseline in both groups [mCIMT: F = 183.750, 128.614, 110.085, P < 0.05; Control: F = 204.007, 75.246, 51.070, P < 0.05]. No significant differences were found between two treatment groups at the 3-month follow-up time point [F = 0.565, P = 0.465; F = 0.228, P = 0.641; F = 0.713, P = 0.413; Z = −0.666, P = 0.505]. However, at the 6-month follow-up time point, AMS and MSS scores were significantly improved in the mCIMT group relative to the control group [F = 8.077, P = 0.013; F = 18.692, P = 0.001].ConclusionmCIMT may benefit the rehabilitation of residual upper limb dysfunction associated with a uBPI in infants.Clinical Trial Registration[www.chictr.org.cn], identifier [ChiCTR1900022119]. (shrink)

While lawyers' independence initially developed as a way of protecting lawyers and their clients from the power of the state, it is now also associated with the protection of the public interest from lawyers who are too close to their clients. In this context independence is seen as a way of ensuring that lawyers act ethically, that is, with regard to their overriding duty to the court and the administration of justice rather than according to sectional, personal or economic interests. (...) It has been noted in various contexts that lawyers who work closely with powerful clients may be less able to withstand client pressure and uphold their obligations to the administration of justice. In-house lawyers are seen as particularly vulnerable due to their position within the client's organisational structure. On the other hand some have argued that the position of in-house lawyers gives them greater potential to exercise independent judgment and influence the ethical behaviour of their organisation. This paper argues that the concept of independence is multi-faceted with the essential aspect being the capacity for independent judgment or independence of mind. This is supported by status, power and structural protections. The paper goes on to critically consider the courts' interpretations of independence of in-house counsel in the context of claims of client legal privilege (also known as legal professional privilege). The paper argues that the judicial tests reveal a number of different approaches with limited connection to core concepts of independence. (shrink)

本书内容包括:曹魏时期名士的儒道兼治;正始名士:名教出于自然;竹林名士:越名教而任自然;西晋时期士大夫的玄儒兼治;东晋时期士大夫的玄儒兼治等。.